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Abstract
The revelation principle asserts that for any indirect mechanism and equilibrium,
there is a corresponding direct mechanism with truth as an equilibrium. Although
the revelation principle has been a fundamental theorem in the theory of mechanism
design for a long time, so far the costs related to strategic actions of agents have not
been fully discussed. In this paper, we propose the notion of prot function, and
claim that the denitions of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism and Bayesian
incentive compatibility should be based on the prot function instead of the utility
function when strategies of agents are costly. After then, we derive two key results:
(1) The strategic action of each agent in a direct mechanism is just to report a type,
and each agent does not need to spend any strategic cost occurred in any indirect
mechanism; (2) When strategies of agents are costly, the proof of revelation principle
is wrong. We construct a labor model with one rm and two agents to show that
a Bayesian implementable social choice function is not truthfully implementable,
which contradicts the revelation principle.
Key words: Revelation principle; Game theory; Mechanism design.
1 Introduction
The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in mechanism design theo-
ry [1{3]. According to the wide-spread textbook given by Mas-Colell, Whin-
ston and Green (Page 884, Line 24 [3]): \The implication of the revelation
principle is ... to identify the set of implementable social choice functions in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we need only identify those that are truthfully
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implementable." Put in other words, the revelation principle says: \suppose
that there exists a mechanism that implements a social choice function f in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then f is truthfully implementable in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium" (Page 76, Theorem 2.4, [4]). Relevant denitions about the
revelation principle are given in Section 2, which are cited from Section 23.B
and 23.D of MWG's textbook [3].
Generally speaking, agents may spend some costs when participating a mech-
anism. There are two kinds of costs possibly occurred in a mechanism: 1)
strategic costs, which are possibly spent by agents when performing strategic
actions 1 ; 2) misreporting costs, which are possibly spent by agents when re-
porting types falsely. 2 In the traditional literature of mechanism design, costs
are usually referred to the former. Recently, some researchers began to inves-
tigate misreporting costs[6,7]. For every type  and every type ^ that an agent
might misreport, Kephart and Conitzer [7] dened a cost function as c(; ^)
for doing so. Traditional mechanism design is just the case where c(; ^) = 0
everywhere, and partial verication is a special case where c(; ^) 2 f0;1g
[8,9]. Kephart and Conitzer [7] proposed that when reporting truthfully is
costless and misreporting is costly, the revelation principle can fail to hold.
Despite these accomplishments, so far people seldom consider the two kinds
of costs simultaneously. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the
revelation principle holds or not when two kinds of costs are considered. The
paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose the notion of prot
function (see Note 1), and claim that the denitions of Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium of mechanism and Bayesian incentive compatibility should be based on
the prot function instead of the utility function when strategies of agents are
costly (see Denition 23.D.1' and Denition 23.D.3'). After then, we derive
two key results:
(1) Each agent's strategy in a direct mechanism is just to report a type. Hence
each agent does not need to spend any strategic cost occurred in any indirect
mechanism (see Proposition 1);
(2) When strategies of agents are costly, the proof of revelation principle in
Proposition 23.D.1 [3] is wrong (see Proposition 2).
In Section 3, we construct a labor model with one rm and two agents, then
dene a social choice function f and an indirect mechanism, in which strate-
gies of agents are costly. In Section 4, we prove f can be implemented by
the indirect mechanism in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (see Proposition 3). In
Section 5, we show that f is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium under some conditions (see Proposition 4), which contradicts the
revelation principle. In the end, Section 6 draws conclusions.
1 For example, agents spend education costs in a job market [5].
2 It is usually assumed that each agent can report his true type with zero cost.
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2 Analysis of strategic costs
In this section, we will investigate costs spent by agents when playing strategies
in a mechanism. In the beginning ,we cite some denitions from Section 23.B
and Section 23.D of MWG's textbook [3] and make comments.
Consider a setting with I agents, 3 indexed by i = 1;    ; I. These agents make
a collective choice from a set X of possible alternatives. Prior to the choice,
each agent i privately observes his type i that determines his preferences over
the alternatives in X. The set of possible types for agent i is denoted as i.
Each agent i is assumed to be an expected utility maximizer, whose Bernoulli
utility function over the outcome x 2 X given his type i is ui(x; i) (see
Section 23.B, Page 858, [3]).
Note 1: Generally speaking, when an agent performs a strategic action in
participating a game, he usually needs to spend some monetary costs (or
make some eorts which can be quantied as monetary costs). Assume each
agent's costs are only relevant to his strategic action and private type, and
are independent of the game outcome. 4
Formally, suppose each agent i with private type i 2 i chooses a strategy si
and performs a strategic action si(i), then his strategic costs can be denoted
as ci(si(i); i). Suppose the outcome is x 2 X, then each agent i's net prot
can be denoted as a prot function:
pi(x; si(i); i) = ui(x; i)  ci(si(i); i): (1)
Discussion 1: Someone may argue that the utility function ui(x; i) already
includes the strategic costs ci(si(i); i) spent by agent i in participating a
game, thus it is not necessary to dene the prot function. For example, In
Section 13.C of MWG's book (Page 450, the fourth line from the bottom, [3]),
the authors use u(w; ej) to denote the utility of a type  agent who chooses
education level e and receives wage w, and u(w; ej) = w   c(e; ).
Answer 1: In the setting of signaling given in Section 13.C of MWG's book,
agent's utility function u(w; ej) contains three parameters: wage w (i:e:, the
outcome received by the agent), education level e (i:e:, the strategy chosen by
the agent) and agent's type . As a comparison, in the setting of mechanism
design given in Section 23.B of MWG's book, agent's utility function ui(x; i)
contains only two parameters: the outcome x and the type i. Since there is no
parameter in ui(x; i) to represent strategic costs, ui(x; i) does not include any
3 The agent is denoted as \He".
4 This assumption is used just to simplify the following formulations and can be
cancelled.
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strategic cost related to any strategy. 5 Therefore, in the setting of mechanism
design given in Section 23.B [3], the prot function pi(x; si(i); i) should be
used to describe agent i's net prot in participating a game. 6 2
Denition 23.B.1 [3]: A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : 1 
    I ! X that, for each possible prole of the agents' types 1;    ; I ,
assigns a collective choice f(1;    ; I) 2 X.
Denition 23.B.3 [3]: A mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) is a collection
of I strategy sets S1;    ; SI and an outcome function g : S1      SI !
X. A mechanism can be viewed as an institution with rules governing the
procedure for making the collective choice. The allowed actions of each agent
i are summarized by the strategy set Si, and the rule for how agents' actions get
turned into a social choice is given by the outcome function g(). The strategy
of each agent i in the game induced by a mechanism is a function si : i ! Si.
The mechanism combined with possible types (1;    ;I), the probability
density () over the possible realizations of  2 1      I , and utility
functions (u1;    ; uI) denes a Bayesian game of incomplete information. 7
Denition 23.B.5 [3]: A direct mechanism is a mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ,
g0()) in which S 0i = i for all i and g0() = f() for all  2 1     I .
Note 2: In a direct mechanism, each agent i's strategy s0i : i ! i can be
viewed as an oral and costless announcement: i:e:, the strategy of each agent
i with private type i is to choose a type s
0
i(i) 2 i to report, and s0i(i)
does not need to be his private type i. After the designer receives all reports
s01(1);    ; s0I(I), she must announce the outcome f(s01(1);    ; s0I(I)).
Denition 23.D.1 [3]: The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i
and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji] (2)
for all s^i 2 Si.
5 Put dierently, suppose that there are two cases where agent i with type i has
two dierent strategies to obtain the same outcome x, then there shall be two
dierent kinds of strategic costs and utilities. But according to the utility function
ui(x; i), these two dierent cases will lead to the same utility ui(x; i). The reason
for this contradiction is that the denition of the utility function ui(x; i) omits the
parameter representing agent's strategy, and hence cannot include the costs related
to agent's strategy.
6 Note that the utility function u(w; ej) = w   c(e; ) given in Section 13.C [3] is
just equivalent to the prot function dened here.
7 The mechanism designer is denoted as \She".
4
Note 3: In Denition 23.D.1, the denition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
a game induced by an indirect mechanism is based on the utility function.
Generally speaking, in an indirect mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()), each
agent i's strategy si(i) is an action that requires some costs to be performed,
i:e:, ci(si(i); i) > 0. As pointed out in Answer 1, the utility function ui(x; i)
of each agent i only describes his utility with respect to the outcome x but
misses his strategic costs, hence cannot describe his net prot. Because it is
the net prot that each rational agent really concerns in any game induced
by any mechanism, the prot function should be used to dene the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of a mechanism. 8 Formally, Denition 23.D.1 should be
reformulated as follows:
Denition 23.D.1' The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [pi(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); s

i (i); i)ji]  E i [pi(g(s^i; s i( i)); s^i; i)ji]
(3)
i:e:,
E i [(ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (i); i))ji] 
E i [(ui(g(s^i; s

 i( i)); i)  ci(s^i; i))ji]
for all s^i 2 Si, in which pi is the prot of agent i given by Eq (1).
Denition 23.D.2 [3]: The mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements the
social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of  , s() = (s1();    ; sI()), such that g(s()) = f() for
all  2 .
Denition 23.D.3 [3]: The social choice function f() is truthfully imple-
mentable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (or Bayesian incentive compatible) if
s0i (i) = i for all i 2 i and i = 1;    ; I is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the direct revelation mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()), in which S 0i = i,
g0 = f . That is, if for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23:D:1)
for all ^i 2 i.
8 In most of practical cases, strategies of agents are costly actions. Only in very
limited cases (e:g:, where strategies of agents are purely oral announcements) can
strategies be viewed costless, and by Eq (1) the utility function is equal to the prot
function. Thus, the traditional denition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium based on the
utility function holds only in these limited cases.
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Note 4: In the direct mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()), for each agent i with
private type i, there are two cases as follows:
1) If he reports truthfully, i:e:, s0i(i) = i, then ci(i; i) = 0 by Footnote 2,
and pi(x; s
0
i(i); i) = ui(x; i) by Eq (1).
2) If he reports falsely, i:e:, s0i(i) = ^i 6= i, then there may exist misreporting
costs ci(^i; i), and pi(x; s
0
i(i); i) = ui(x; i)  ci(^i; i) by Eq (1).
Similar to Note 3, the prot function should be used to dene the notion
of Bayesian incentive compatibility. Following Denition 23.D.1', Denition
23.D.3 should be reformulated as follows:
Denition 23.D.3' The social choice function f() is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (or Bayesian incentive compatible) if s0i (i) = i
for all i 2 i and i = 1;    ; I is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct
revelation mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()), in which S 0i = i, g0 = f . That
is, if for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)  ci(^i; i)ji]; (4)
for all ^i 2 i, in which ci(^i; i) is the cost for agent i with private type i to
misreport ^i 2 i. 9
Proposition 1: The strategy of each agent i in the direct mechanism  0 =
(S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()) is just to report a type from i. Each agent i does not need
to take any other action to prove himself that his reported type is truthful, and
should not play any strategic action as specied in any indirect mechanism.
Hence, in a direct mechanism, each agent does not need to spend any strategic
cost related to strategic actions specied in any indirect mechanism.
Proof: By Denition 23.B.5, in the direct mechanism  0, the strategy set
S 0i = i, thus the strategy s
0
i chosen by agent i with private type i is just
to choose a type from i to report, i:e:, s
0
i(i) 2 i. Obviously, the designer
cannot enforce each agent to report truthfully, and each agent does not need
to take any action to prove himself that his reported type is truthful. 10
Hence, each agent i with true type i will misreport another type s
0
i(i) 6= i
whenever doing so is worthwhile. After the designer receives s01(1);    ; s0I(I),
she has no way to verify whether these reports are truthful or not. What the
9 If the misreporting cost ci(^i; i) = 0 for each agent i, then Denition 23.D.3' will
be reduced to Denition 23.D.3.
10Otherwise, assume to the contrary that each agent i has to prove himself that
his reported type is truthful. Then there will be no information disadvantage from
the viewpoint of the designer : the agents' types are no longer their private informa-
tion, and the designer can directly specify her favorite outcome f(1;    ; I) after
receiving agents' reports 1;    ; I . This case contradicts the basic framework of
mechanism design, therefore the assumption does not hold.
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designer can do is just to announce f(s01(1);    ; s0I(I)) as the outcome. Thus,
it is wrong to assume that in a direct mechanism the designer can require each
agent perform any strategic action specied in any indirect mechanism. As a
result, in a direct mechanism, each agent i does not need to spend any strategic
cost related to strategic actions specied in any indirect mechanism. 2
Discussion 2: Someone may disagree with Proposition 1. For a given social
choice function f , suppose there is an indirect mechanism   that implements
f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Consider this equilibrium, there is a mapping
from vectors of agents' types into outcomes. Now we take the mapping to be a
revelation game, i:e:, each agent chooses a type to report to the designer, and
the designer suggests each agent an action which he would take in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the indirect mechanism  . Then no type of any agent can
benet by deviating from reporting his true type and performing the suggested
action. As a result, the notion of direct mechanism is extended and each agent
spends the same strategic costs in the \extended direct mechanism" as what
he would spend in the indirect mechanism.
Answer 2: It should be noted that behind the revelation game, there actually
exists an underlying assumption: Each agent i is willing to inform the designer
his strategy si() chosen in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game induced
by the indirect mechanism  . Only when this assumption holds can the de-
signer know which action she should suggest to each agent i after receiving an
arbitrary prole of agents' reported types, since the suggested action for each
agent i is just what he would take in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
However, the strategy of each agent i is his private function si : i ! Si,
which describes his individual strategic action si(i) for each possible type
i 2 i [3]. In the framework of mechanism design, the designer is ALWAYS
at the information disadvantage: she does not know neither the private type
i of each agent i, nor the strategy function si() that describes how each
agent i acts strategically. 11 What the designer knows from each agent i are
only one result, i:e:, si(i). Therefore, it is wrong to imagine that each agent
i will voluntarily reveal his private strategy si() to the designer (or a virtual
mediator) without obtaining any more prot. 12
To sum up, the logic of the extended direct mechanism is circular : At rst, each
agent i is assumed to be willing to reveal his one part of private information
(i:e:, private strategy si : i ! Si) to the designer. Then, each agent i \nds
11Otherwise, assume to the contrary that the designer knows each agent i's strategy
function si(), then she can easily infer each agent i's private type i from si(i),
which is the input parameter of the outcome function. This case contradicts the
basic framework of mechanism design and does not hold.
12 The notion of direct mechanism dened in MWG's book does not need the so-
called assumption (see Denition 23.B.5, [3])
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it optimal" to reveal his another part of private information (i:e:, private type
i) to the designer, and obey the suggested action si(i) sent by the designer.
Obviously, this circular reasoning is invalid. Hence, the so-called extended
direct mechanism does not hold. 2
Proposition 2: Given an indirect mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()), if each
strategic action si(i) is costly, i:e:, ci(si(i); i) > 0, then the proof of the
revelation principle given in Proposition 23.D.1 [3] is wrong.
Proof: According to the proof of Proposition 23.D.1 (see Appendix), suppose
that there exists an indirect mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that implements
the social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there exists
a prole of strategies s() = (s1();    ; sI()) such that the mapping g(s()) :
1      I ! X from a vector of agents' types  = (1;    ; I) into an
outcome g(s()) is equal to the desired outcome f(), i:e:, g(s()) = f()
for all  2 1     I . By Denition 23.D.1', for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [(ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (i); i))ji] 
E i [(ui(g(s^i; s

 i( i)); i)  ci(s^i; i))ji]
for all s^i 2 Si. Thus, for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [(ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (i); i))ji] 
E i [(ui(g(s

i (^i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (^i); i))ji]
for all ^i 2 i.
Since g(s()) = f() for all , then for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [(ui(f(i;  i); i) ci(si (i); i))ji]  E i [(ui(f(^i;  i); i) ci(si (^i); i))ji];
(5)
for all ^i 2 i. Note that this inequality cannot infer the inequality in Def-
inition 23.D.3', which represents the sucient condition of Bayesian incen-
tive compatibility. Consequently, the proof of the revelation principle given in
Proposition 23.D.1 [3] is wrong. 2
3 A labor model and a social choice function f
Here we construct a labor model to show revelation principle does not always
hold. The labor model uses ideas from the rst-price sealed auction model in
Example 23.B.5 [3] and the signaling model [3,5]. There are one rm (i:e:, the
designer) and two agents. Agent 1 and Agent 2 dier in the number of units
of output that they produce if hired by the rm, which is denoted by private
8
productivity type. The rm chooses wage w > 0 and wants to hire an agent
with productivity as high as possible, and the two agents compete for this job.
For simplicity, we make the following assumptions:
1) The possible productivity type i of each agent i (i = 1; 2) is L or H , where
H > L > 0. Each agent i's productivity type is his private information.
2) There is a certicate that the rm can publicly announce as a hire criterion.
If each of (or neither of) two agents has the certicate, then each agent will be
hired with probability 0.5. The education level corresponding to the certicate
is eH > 0. Each agent decides by himself whether to get the certicate or not,
hence the possible education level ei of each agent i = 1; 2 is eH or 0. The
education level does nothing for an agent's productivity.
3) The strategic cost of obtaining education level ei for agent i (i = 1; 2)
with productivity type i is given by a function ci(ei; i) = ei=i. That is, the
strategic cost is lower for a higher productivity agent to obtain the certicate.
4) The misreporting cost for an agent with low productivity to report the high
productivity type H is a xed value cmis  0. In addition, a high-productivity
agent can report the low-productivity type L with zero costs.
The labor model's outcome is represented by a vector (y1; y2), where yi denotes
the probability that agent i gets the job. Recall that the rm does not know
the exact productivity types of two agents, and its aim is to hire an agent
with productivity as high as possible. This aim can be represented by a social
choice function f() = (y1(); y2()), in which  = (1; 2).
f() = (y1(); y2()) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if 1 > 2
(0:5; 0:5); if 1 = 2
(0; 1); if 1 < 2
: (6)
In order to implement the above social choice function f(), the rm designs an
indirect mechanism   = (S1; S2; g) as follows: Each agent i = 1; 2, conditional
on his type i 2 fL; Hg, chooses his education level as a bid ei : fL; Hg !
f0; eHg. The strategy set Si is the set of agent i's all possible bids, and the
outcome function g is dened as:
g(e1; e2) = (g1; g2) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if e1 = eH ; e2 = 0
(0:5; 0:5); if e1 = e2
(0; 1); if e1 = 0; e2 = eH
; (7)
where gi (i = 1; 2) is the probability that agent i gets the job.
13
Let u1; u2 be the utilities of agent 1; 2 , and p1; p2 be the prots of agent 1; 2
13 For the case of ei < ej , i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j, agent i has no chance to get the job.
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from participating the indirect mechanism   respectively. For i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j,
ui(ei; ej; i) =
8>><>>:
w; if ei > ej
0:5w; if ei = ej
0; if ei < ej
; (8)
pi(ei; ej; i) = ui(ei; ej; i)  ci(ei; i) = ui(ei; ej; i)  ei=i: (9)
The item \ei=i" in Eq (9) denotes the strategic costs spent by agent i with
type i when he obtains the education level ei. Suppose the reserved utilities
of agent 1 and agent 2 are both zero, then the individual rationality (IR)
constraints are: pi(ei; ej; i)  0, i = 1; 2.
4 f is Bayesian implementable
Proposition 3: If w = 2eH=H , then the social choice function f() given in
Eq (6) is Bayesian implementable, i.e., it can be implemented by the indirect
mechanism   given by Eq (7) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider a separating strategy, i:e:, agents with dierent productivity
types choose dierent education levels,
e1(1) =
8<:eH ; if 1 = H0; if 1 = L ; e2(2) =
8<:eH ; if 2 = H0; if 2 = L : (10)
Now let us check whether this separating strategy yields a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Assume ej(j) (j = 1; 2) takes this form, i:e:,
ej(j) =
8<:eH ; if j = H0; if j = L ; (11)
then we consider agent i's problem (i = 1; 2; i 6= j). For each i 2 fL; Hg,
agent i solves a maximization problem: maxei h(ei; i), where by Eq (9) and
Footnote 13, the object function is
h(ei; i) = (w   ei=i)P (ei > ej(j)) + (0:5w   ei=i)P (ei = ej(j)); (12)
where P () returns value 1 if the input condition is true, and value 0 otherwise.
We discuss this maximization problem in four dierent cases:
1) Suppose i = j = L, then e

j(j) = 0 by Eq (11).
h(ei; i) = (w   ei=L)P (ei > 0) + (0:5w   ei=L)P (ei = 0)
=
8<:w   eH=L; if ei = eH0:5w; if ei = 0 :
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Thus, if 0 < w < 2eH=L, then w   eH=L < 0:5w, i:e:, h(eH ; L) < h(0; L),
which means the optimal level of ei(L) is 0. In this case, e

i (L) = 0.
2) Suppose i = L, j = H , then e

j(j) = eH by Eq (11).
h(ei; i) = (w   ei=L)P (ei > eH) + (0:5w   ei=L)P (ei = eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=L; if ei = eH0; if ei = 0 :
Thus, if 0 < w < 2eH=L, then 0:5w   eH=L < 0, i:e:, h(eH ; L) < h(0; L),
which means the optimal level of ei(L) is 0. In this case, e

i (L) = 0.
3) Suppose i = H , j = L, then e

j(j) = 0 by Eq (11).
h(ei; i) = (w   ei=H)P (ei > 0) + (0:5w   ei=H)P (ei = 0)
=
8<:w   eH=H ; if ei = eH0:5w; if ei = 0 :
Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then w   eH=H > 0:5w, i:e:, h(eH ; H) > h(0; H),
which means the optimal level of ei(H) is eH . In this case, e

i (H) = eH .
4) Suppose i = j = H , then e

j(j) = eH by Eq (11).
h(ei; i) = (w   ei=H)P (ei > eH) + (0:5w   ei=H)P (ei = eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=H ; if ei = eH0; if ei = 0 :
Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then 0:5w   eH=H > 0, i:e:, h(eH ; H) > h(0; H),
which means the optimal level of ei(H) is eH . In this case, e

i (H) = eH .
From the above four cases, it can be seen that if the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L),
then the strategy ei (i) of agent i (i = 1; 2)
ei (i) =
8<:eH ; if i = H0; if i = L (13)
will be the optimal response to the strategy ej(j) of agent j (j 6= i) given
in Eq (11). Obviously, for a rational designer, she shall choose the minimal
boundary of the wage range (2eH=H ; 2eH=L), i:e:, w = 2eH=H .
14 As a
result, the strategy prole (e1(1); e

2(2)) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
the game induced by  .
14 In principle, the designer shall choose the wage a little bit larger than 2eH=H .
However, we omit this tiny dierence here.
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Now let us investigate whether the wage w = 2eH=H satises the individual
rationality (IR) constraints or not. Following Eq (9) and Eq (13), the (IR)
constraints are changed into: 0:5w   eH=H >= 0. Therefore, w = 2eH=H
satises the (IR) constraints.
In summary, if w = 2eH=H , then by Eq (7) and Eq (13), for any  = (1; 2),
where 1; 2 2 fL; Hg, there holds:
g(e1(1); e

2(2)) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if 1 > 2
(0:5; 0:5); if 1 = 2
(0; 1); if 1 < 2
; (14)
which is the social choice function f() given in Eq (6). Thus, f can be im-
plemented by the indirect mechanism   in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2
5 The Bayesian implementable f is not truthfully implementable
In this section, we will show by the following proposition that a Bayesian
implementable social choice function is not truthfully implementable, which
means that the revelation principle does not always hold when strategies of
agents are costly.
Proposition 4: If the misreporting cost cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), then the social choice
function f given in Eq (6) is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the direct revelation mechanism  0 = (1;2; f()), in which
1 = 2 = fL; Hg,  = (1; 2) 2 1  2. The strategy of each agent i
(i = 1; 2) with private type i is to strategically report a type ^i 2 i to the
rm 15 . Then the rm performs the outcome function f(^1; ^2) as specied in
Eq (6).
According to Proposition 1, in the direct mechanism  0, each agent i only
reports a type and does not spend any strategic cost. The only possible cost
for agent i is the misreporting cost cmis for a low-productivity agent to falsely
report the high-productivity type H . For agent i (i = 1; 2), if his private type
15Here ^i may not be equal to i.
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is i = L, then by Eq (9) his prot will be as follows:
p0i(^i; ^j; i = L) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
w   cmis; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; L)
0:5w   cmis; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; H)
0:5w; if (^i; ^j) = (L; L)
0; if (^i; ^j) = (L; H)
; i 6= j: (15)
If agent i's private type is i = H , then by Eq (9) his prot will be as follows:
p0i(^i; ^j; i = H) =
8>><>>:
w; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; L)
0:5w; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; H); or(L; L)
0; if (^i; ^j) = (L; H)
; i 6= j: (16)
Note that the item \ei=i" occurred in Eq (9) disappears in Eq (15) and Eq
(16), because each agent i does not spend any strategic cost in the direct
mechanism. Following Eq (15) and Eq (16), we will discuss the prot matrix
of agent i and j (i 6= j, i; j = 1; 2) in four cases as follows. The rst and second
entry in the parenthesis denote the prot of agent i and j after reporting types
^i, ^j to the rm respectively.
Case 1: Suppose the private types of agent i and j are i = H , j = H .XXXXXXXXXXXXi = H
j = H ^j = L ^j = H
^i = L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w)
^i = H (w; 0) (0:5w; 0:5w)
It can be seen that the dominant strategy for agent i and j is to truthfully
report, i.e., ^i = H , ^j = H . Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium is (^1; ^2) =
(H ; H).
Case 2: Suppose the private types of agent i and j are i = L, j = H .XXXXXXXXXXXXi = L
j = H ^j = L ^j = H
^i = L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w)
^i = H (w   cmis; 0) (0:5w   cmis; 0:5w)
It can be seen that the dominant strategy for agent j is still to truthfully
report ^j = H ; and if the misreporting cost 0  cmis < 0:5w, the dominant
strategy for agent i is to falsely report ^i = H , otherwise agent i would
truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique
Nash equilibrium is (^1; ^2) = (H ; H).
Case 3: Suppose the private types of agent i and j are i = H , j = L.
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XXXXXXXXXXXXi = H
j = L ^j = L ^j = H
^i = L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w   cmis)
^i = H (w; 0) (0:5w; 0:5w   cmis)
It can be seen that the dominant strategy for agent i is still to truthfully
report ^i = H ; and if the misreporting cost 0  cmis < 0:5w, the dominant
strategy for agent j is to falsely report ^j = H , otherwise agent j would
truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique
Nash equilibrium is (^1; ^2) = (H ; H).
Case 4: Suppose the private types of agent i and j are i = L, j = L.XXXXXXXXXXXXi = L
j = L ^j = L ^j = H
^i = L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w   cmis)
^i = H (w   cmis; 0) (0:5w   cmis; 0:5w   cmis)
It can be seen that if the misreporting cost 0  cmis < 0:5w, the dominant
strategy for both agent i and agent j is to falsely report, i.e., ^i = H , ^j = H ,
otherwise both agents would truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of
cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique Nash equilibrium is (^1; ^2) = (H ; H).
To sum up, under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique equilibri-
um of the game induced by the direct mechanism  0 is to xedly report
(^1; ^2) = (H ; H), and the unique outcome of  
0 is that each agent has the
same probability 0.5 to get the job oer. Consequently, the truthful report
(^1; ^2) = (1; 2) (for all i 2 i, i = 1; 2) is not a Bayesian Nash equilibri-
um of the direct revelation mechanism. By Denition 23.D.3', the Bayesian
implementable social choice function f() given in Eq (6) is not truthfully im-
plementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium under the conditions of w = 2eH=H
and cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), which means that the revelation principle does not always
hold when strategies of agents are costly. 2
Discussion 3: Someone may argue that the labor model is not fundamentally
dierent from an auction where making a bid is costly in the sense that the
bidder has to pay the bid amount if he wins the object. The dierence is that
in the labor model, the education cost is not paid to the rm. However, this
dierence is immaterial since the payment of the education cost is veriable
by the rm.
Answer 3: In the label model, after the rm announces the outcome function
(see Eq (7)), each agent i individually chooses his education level ei to be 0
or eH (i:e:, decides whether to undergo the education and produce the certi-
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cate). For each agent i, it is the observable education level ei rather than the
private education cost ci = ei=i that acts as his bid. Thus, the labor model is
fundamentally dierent from the standard auction in that each agent i's bid ei
only reects what his strategic action is (i.e., whether to obtain the certicate
or not), but does not reect how much he pays for his action (i.e., the value
of his education cost is not observable and veriable to the rm). Hence, the
argument does not hold. 2
Discussion 4: Someone may argue that the labor model considers two dier-
ent economic environments:
1) In the case in which the social choice function is Bayesian implementable
(Proposition 3), each agent needs to get some education before working at the
rm and has to spend the cost of obtaining an education level.
2) On the other hand, in the case in which the social choice function is not
truthfully implementable (Proposition 4), each agent does not need to get any
education to work at the rm and hence there is no education cost.
The dierence between these two cases might be interpreted as the dierence
in sets of feasible outcomes rather than that in mechanisms the rm uses.
Answer 4: This argument omits the reason why there are these two dierent
cases.
1) In the former case, the agents participate the indirect mechanism. Each
agent i with type i is required by the indirect mechanism to choose an edu-
cation level, and thus needs to spend the education cost eH=i if his education
level ei = eH .
2) In the latter case, the agents participate the direct mechanism. According
to the direct mechanism, the only legal action for each agent is just to report
a type, and he does not need to spend any education cost except for possible
misreporting costs.
Thus, the dierence in two sets of feasible outcomes is just from the dierence
in two dierent mechanism the rm uses. 2
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates strategic costs and misreporting costs possibly spent
by agents in a mechanism. We propose the notion of prot function, and claim
that the denition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism should be based
on the prot function instead of the utility function when strategies of agents
are costly. We emphasize that each agent's strategy in a direct mechanism is
just to report a type and he does not need to spend any strategic cost occurred
in any indirect mechanism (see Proposition 1). The denitions of Bayesian
Nash equilibrium and Bayesian incentive compatibility should be revised using
the prot function (see Denition 23.D.1' and Denition 23.D.3', Section 2).
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This is the key point why the proof of revelation principle given in Proposition
23.D.1 [3] is wrong (see Proposition 2). Since strategies of agents are usually
costly actions in many practical cases (see Footnote 8), the revelation principle
holds only in very limited cases where strategies of agents can be viewed
costless.
In Section 3, we propose a labor model with one rm and two agents. Section
4 and Section 5 give detailed analysis about the labor model:
1) In the indirect mechanism, the prot of each agent is given by Eq (9), and
the separating strategy prole (e1(1); e

2(2)) given by Eq (13) is the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium when wage w = 2eH=H . Thus, the social choice function f
can be implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
2) In the direct mechanism, the prot of each agent is revised from Eq (9)
to Eq (15) and Eq (16). Under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique
equilibrium of the game induced by the direct mechanism is to xedly report
(^1; ^2) = (H ; H), and the truthful report (^1; ^2) = (1; 2) is no longer the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which means that the revelation principle does
not hold in this case.
3) Dierent from Kephart and Conitzer [7], the revelation principle can fail to
hold even when misreporting cost cmis = 0 (see Proposition 4).
Appendix
Proposition 23.D.1 [3]: (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash E-
quilibrium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that
implements the social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f() is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: If   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements f() in Bayesian Nash equilibri-
um, then there exists a prole of strategies s() = (s1();    ; sI()) such that
g(s()) = f() for all , and for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji]; (23.D.2)
for all s^i 2 Si. Condition (23.D.2) implies, in particular, that for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(si (^i); s i( i)); i)ji]; (23.D.3)
for all ^i 2 i. Since g(s()) = f() for all , (23.D.3) means that, for all i
and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23.D.4)
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for all ^i 2 i. But, this is precisely condition (23.D.1) 16 , the condition for
f() to be truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2
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